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Bigots Beware:
Wisconsin v. Mitchell and the
Legalization of Penalty Enhancement
Alisha Prinvale
Intolerance is alive and well in America. This is
manifested in the prevalence of "hate crimes." Hate crimes are
those crimes committed to person or property specifically due
to the person or owner's race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, or ancestry. With the growth of
hate crimes, many states have instituted hate crime legislation.
In Wisconsin, this legislation comes in the form of penalty
enhancement. According to Wisconsin law, sec. 939.645,
Stats., a perpetrator may receive an extended sentence if it can
be proven that the perpetrator intentionally selected the
victim because of the victim's race, religion, color, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry (508 U.S. 481).
A particular perpetrator, Todd Mitchell, challenged the
constitutionality of this statute. The Supreme Court
ultimately decided against Mitchell and thus gave States the
permission to draft hate crime legislation.
On the evening of October 7, 1989, nineteen-year-old
Todd Mitchell was among approximately ten black young
men discussing the film Mississippi Burning outside an
apartment complex. Mitchell began instigating the crowd by
asking, "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white
people?" Fourteen-year-old Gregory Reddick appeared
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moments later on the other side of the street. Mitchell then
further provoked the crowd by asking, "You all want to f*'~k
somebody up?" He then said, "There goes a white boy, go get
him," after which he counted to three and pointed at Reddick.
The group ran to Reddick and knocked him down. For up to
five minutes, the group kicked, punched, and stomped on
Reddick, leaving him unconscious and stealing his British
Knights athletic shoes. Reddick remained in a coma for four
days. The injuries sustained could have resulted in permanent
brain damage and would have been fatal if he had not received
medical treatment. Subsequently, Mitchell was convicted by a
court in Kenosha, Wisconsin of aggravated battery, party to a
crime; intentionally selecting battery victim due to race; and
theft, party to a crime. Under W~sconsin law, Mitchell's
sentence could be extended since he intentionally selected
Reddick on account of Reddick's race. Consequently, instead
of the maximum two year sentence, Mitchell received a four
year sentence (485 N.W.2d 807).
Mitchell appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
seeking post-conviction relief and claimed the Wisconsin
statute unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. First,
Mitchell claimed the statute was too vague. Mitchell secondly
claimed the statute was too broad. It intruded upon a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity. This
created a "chilling effect" and thereby limited free speech. The
Court of Appeals rejected his allegations. Usually, the burden
of proving a statute unconstitutional rests on the defendant,
however, in First Amendment cases the burden of proof rests
on the plaintiff. In contrast, the court decided the burden of
proof belonged to Mitchell.
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In the opinion of the court, Judge RichardS. Brown first
considered Mitchell's vagueness claim. To be considered
ambiguous, the law must be written such th~t:
One bent on obedience may not d1scern when the
region of proscribed conduct is n~ared ?r such th~t
the trier of fact in ascertaining gu1lt or mnocence 1s
relegated to creating and applying its own standards
of culpability rather than applying standards
proscribed in the statute or rule. (473 N.W.2d 4)
Mitchell claimed the phrase "intentionally selects" and the
term "race" were vague. Citing Wisconsin law sec. 939.23(3)
Stats. and Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary Brown defined
"intentionally selects" as "to purposefully pick out" (Ibid.). In
addition, Brown declared neither race nor color were
ambiguous. In the crime committed, both race and color were
covered. Mitchell is black and Reddick is white; using either
criteria, race or color, the law was violated. Additionally,
Mitchell claimed the phrase "intentionally selects" was .
ambiguous in application because the statute does not defme
how to determine intentional selection of a victim. For
instance, a perpetrator may use racial epithets when
committing assault, yet, this does not prove the perp~trator
intentionally selected his victim. Brown answered th1s
challenge with his interpretation of the phrase "?e~aus~ of."
The statute did not punish the selection of the v1ct1m; 1t
punished the crime if the intentional selection was based on
the victim's race. Thus, Brown concluded the statute was not
vague.
Next the court examined Mitchell's claim of
overbread~h. Brown found this claim hard to follow (Ibid.,
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at 5). Mitchell supported his claim of overbreadth with an
example of racial epithets. Since the First Amendment
protected racial epithets as general speech, they should also be
legal while committing a crime. However, the Wisconsin
statute aimed at selection not speech. The statute punished
conduct ~nd proscr~bed ~ertain conduct where words may be
used .as ~Ircumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the statute did
not hmlt free speech. On these grounds, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals affirmed Mitchell's sentence.
. ~itchell. then petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Th1s time, Mitchell renewed his First Amendment challenge
and appeal~d on Fourteenth Amendment grounds as well,
perhaps th1s worked to his advantage because the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled in Mitchell's favor. Chief Justice
Hefferman wrote the majority opinion. Hefferman and his
court found the statute unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds, and subsequently did not discuss Mitchell's
Fourteenth Amendment challenge.
. Co~trary to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the
Wisc~nsi? Su~reme Court put the burden to prove
constitutiOnality on the State. The State failed to prove
constitutionality and therefore, Hefferman found the statute
in violati~~ the First Amendment. The statute punished
thought, It a1m[ed] at the bigoted bias of the actor" (485
N.W.2d 813). The statute punished offensive motive or
thought b~cause "selecting" cannot be objectively established.
The selectiOn process must involve a subjective examination of
the motive, the evidence used in this case showed a racial bias.
The reason the court held the selection process
unconstitutional was because the motive was equated with
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prejudice, a constitutionally protected entity. Further, the.
statute is overstated in its interpretation because by "sweepmg
protected activity within its reach it deters citizens from
exercising their protected constitutional freedoms [and creates]
the so-called chilling effect" (Ibid.,at 815). The chilling effect
was an implicit restraint on constitutionally protected speech.
Hefferman did not believe penalty enhancements rest on the
same point of law as antidiscrimination laws, alr~ady held to
be constitutional. Anti-discrimination laws pumsh the act of
refusing to hire a person based on status. Penalty
enhancements, on the other hand, punish the selection
process, or a mental act. On vagueness and overbreadth
grounds, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that penalty
enhancers were unconstitutional.
Two justices, on the other hand, filed a dissenting
opinion. First, Justice Shirley S. Abrahamso~ maintain:d the
statute punished conduct only. The statute d1d not pumsh
bigoted thought; it must prov~ that the ~igote~ remark~
.
figured in directly with the cnme. In Mitchells case, h1s racist
remarks were directly responsible for the crime. The statute
in this instance prohibited conduct, not thought. Justice
William A. Bablitch also filed a dissenting opinion. In his
opinion, Bablitch argued the First Amendment wa~ not
implicated. According to Bablitch, the. statute pu~ushe~
purposeful selection. Using words as circumstantial evidence
did not chill free speech . He argued that penalty
enhancement laws were no different than antidiscrimination
laws. Anti-discrimination laws do not punish failure to hire as
a crime, rather they punished the failure to hire due to rae~,
national origin, gender, etc. Similarly, sec. 939.645 Stats. d1d
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not evaluate why a victim was chosen, but rather it limited its
influence to cases where the presence of race was a substantial
factor in the decision process. "The victim's status must be a
substantial factor in the selection decision to the extent that in
the absence of that status the perpetrator would not have
selected the victim (Ibid., at 827). The constitution protected
bigoted thought, but not acts upon those thoughts. For those
reasons, both Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch filed
dissents.
The State then appealed Wisconsin v. Mitchell to the
United States Supreme Court. James E. Doyle, Attorney
General of Wisconsin, argued on behalf of the petitioner.
Lynn S. Adelman argued the cause for the respondent.
Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for the United States
with an amicus curiae urging for a reversal of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision. The case was argued on April21,
1993. On June 11, 1993, the Court unanimously reversed and
remanded the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision. Chief
Justice Rehnquist delivered the comparatively short opinion
for the Court. Before considering the question of the case, he
addressed the issue of jurisdiction. Mitchell correctly asserted
the United States Supreme Court was bound by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute. However, the
State Supreme Court only characterized a practical effect, it
did not construe the instant statute to define a particular
phrase. As such, the U.S. Supreme Court offered its own
opinion. Although Mitchell renewed his Fourteenth
Amendment challenge, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
consider it because the Wisconsin Supreme Court had not.
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question
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of whether the First Amendment prohibited penalty
enhancement.
The Court did not find the Wisconsin statute to have a
chilling effect on free speech. "To think one would suppress
bigoted ideas for fear o.f penalty enha~ceme~t was too
speculative a hypothesis to support Mttchell s overbre~dth
claim" (508 U.S. 489). In addition, thoug~ sp~ech can mclude
conduct if expressed as an idea, the Const1tut10n does not
protect physical assault. Also, the court system can. not
punish thoughts, but sentencing judges can use mottves to
ensure the penalty fits the crime. The Court referred to"
statements made in an earlier case, Delaware v. Dawson, The
Constitution does not erect a per se barrier against admission
of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at
sentencing" (508 U.S. 477) ..The sente.nci~g j~dge ~a~
.
consider motive but not behef. Constdenng 1s vahd, motlve
plays the same role under the Wisconsin statute as it does
under federal and state anti-discrimination laws" (Ibid., at 488).
With this opinion, the Supreme Court ruled penalty
enhancement laws not a violation of the First Amendment and
thus constitutional.
With this ruling, the Supreme Court allowed hate crime
legislature to stand. In a previous term, the Court. ruled a St.
Paul Minnesota statute unconstitutional that pumshed
"fighting words" which provoked violence on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender. In R.A. V. v. St.. ~aul,
the Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance was exphcttly
directed at expression and violated the First A~endment. The
ruling in R.A. V. made punishing biased speech tllegal. As a
result , some anti-discrimination laws would appear to be
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unconstitutional, since speech may be implicated in
determining a bias in hiring. However, the Supreme Court
based its decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell on the same grounds
as in anti-discrimination laws, which is conduct. Hence,
Wisconsin v. Mitchell allowed anti-discrimination laws to stand.
The ruling in Wisconsin v. Mitchell clarified antidiscrimination legislature, but also created ambiguity. The
Court failed to differentiate between speech and conduct.
Under the terms of law, to determine conduct one must, "ask
whether the intent is to convey a particular message," and if
"[the] likelihood is great that the message will be understood
by those who view it" (Recent 1994, 240). Under these terms,
racially motivated physical assault was constitutionally
protected. In addition, the failure to address the applicability
of penalty enhancement to prohibited speech offenses
motivated by prejudices created loopholes in the law (Bader
1994, 256).
Even after the Mitchell ruling, legislatures can still punish
speech by construing speech as conduct. Penalty enhancemen
for speech based offenses is still invalid, but courts can define
conduct in speech crimes as the selection of the victim. Thus,
the courts can circumvent the R.A. V. decision and impose
burdens on disfavored speech. Finally, the Court fails to
clarify bias-inspired crimes that mix elements of speech and
nonexpressive conduct and thus, leaves another area of law
without specific guidelines. Hence, the Supreme Court's
ruling allows states to take yet another step in eradicating the
trend of hate crimes, but fails to clarify Mitchell's limits in
interpreting conduct and speech under the First Amendment.
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